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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH

BERNARD LAWRENCE ALEXANDER,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

Case No.
vs.

9856

JOHN W. TURNER, Warden, Utah
State Prison,
Defendant and Respondent.

PETITION FOR REHEARING

BASIS FOR PETITION FOR REHEARING
The respondent, State of Utah, respectfully submits
that the decision of the court rendered herein November
7, 1963, remanding the case with directions to the Second
District Court and ordering appellant's release does not
properly appraise the significant and important legal issues
involved in the case. Respondent further contends that
this court should grant this petition for rehearing and reconsider its previous decision.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE OPINION OF THE COURT IGNORES
THE ISSUES RELEVANT TO THE CASE AND
THE PREVIOUS PRECEDENT GOVERNING
THOSE ISSUES.
It is strongly urged by the State that the sole question
in this case is whether or not a sentence whereby an erroneous place for incarceration is designated is void or whether
it is only voidable. If it is void-which the State contends
-the action of Judge N orseth, in denying Alexander's petition for a writ of habeas corpus and convening a new sentencing hearing wherein relevant material to appellant's
sentence was adduced, was correct. Bear in mind that the
Judge, at that time, approached the question of punishment as a de novo matter and it was totally within his discretion to sentence Alexander to one year in the Weber
County Jail, give him credit for the time served under the
void sentence, and then to order his release. However, with
all of the facts in his possession, the Judge· exercised his
exclusive discretion and sentenced Alexander to the State
Prison.
If the original sentence by Judge Wahlquist was not
void, but only an error, it was only correctable on appeal
by the State and the subsequent action by Judge Norseth
of resentencing Alexander would be an absolute nullity
and correctable on review by this court. In this light, the
State of Utah again strongly urges that the question of
whether or not a sentence designating the improper place
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is void has been answered on two previous occasions by
this very court. The majority opinion in the instant case
states, after reviewing and reciting the sentence imposed
by Judge Wahlquist:
"The sentence for that term was a lawful and
proper one for the crime charged. Of lesser and
subordinate importance is that it designated the
State Prison instead of the County Jail as the place
it should be served. This was an impropriety which
could be corrected at the instance of either the defendant or the state."
In support of this statement, the majority opinion cites the
case of Ex Parte Tani, 29 Nev. 385, 91 Pac. 137, (1907).
Such a conclusion appears to fly in the face of the previously established law on this point as laid down by this
very court in Frankey v. Patten, 75 Utah 231, 34 Pac. 318
(1929), and Folck v. Watson, 102 Utah 471, 132 P. 2d 130
(1942).
In the Frankey case, the petitioner was convicted of
violating a city ordinance and was ordered imprisoned in
the county jail in default of paying the fine imposed. The
statute applicable provided for imprisonment in the city
jail. It was held that the sentence was void. The prisoner
was discharged from imprisonment in the county jail, but
without prejudice to the right of the city further lawfully
to proceed in the cause or to the legal right of the petitioner to object to whatever further proceedings might be
pursued or invoked by the city. The court said:
"Where the law prescribes a place of imprisonment, the court cannot direct a different place. To
order that a person be imprisoned and confined in
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a place where the law does not allow the court to
imprison him, said Mr. Justice Field in the case Re
Bonner (1894), 151 U. S. 258, 38 L. Ed. 152, 14 S.
Ct. 326, is unauthorized and 'to deny the writ of
habeas corpus, in such a case, is a virtual suspension of it.' To the same effect are also the cases
of In Re Mills (1890), 135 U. S. 263, 34 L. Ed. 107,
10 S. Ct. 762; Lemmon v. State, (1908), 77 Ohio
St. 427, 83 N. E. 608; Davis v. Davis (1919), 42 S.
Dak. 294, 174 N. W. 741; Moulton v. Commonwealth
(1913), 215 Mass. 525, 102 N. E. 689. The court
being unauthorized to order the imprisonment of
the petitioner in the county jail and a judgment in
such particular void. The detention and imprisonment of the petitioner by the sheriff in a county
jail is unlawful and a petitioner entitled to be discharged therefrom. That is what he seeks by his
petition, and holding as we do that his . detention
and imprisonment by the sheriff is unlawful and
it is our bounden duty to discharge him therefrom."
To the same effect is the Folck case, wherein appellant was
convicted in the City Court of Ogden City. On appeal appellant entered a plea of guilty in the District Court for
Weber County to a charge, of operating a motor vehicle
upon a public street while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, in violation of an ordinance of Ogden City. The
District Judge sentenced appellant to be "imprisoned in
the City Jail of Weber County for six months, and said
defendant is ordered imprisoned in said County Jail." The
ordinance under which appellant was convicted provided:
"Any person convicted of a violation of this
section shall be punished by imprisonment in the
City Jail for not less than thirty days nor more
than six months * * *" (Emphasis added.)
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5
Defendant applied for a writ of habeas corpus in the District Court of Weber County and contended that the punishment imposed upon him was invalid in that the sentencing court went beyond its jurisdiction in sentencing him
to a place of confinement other than provided for in the
ordinance, to-wit, the City Jail. To this the Supreme
Court held:

"* * * The contention is well founded,
where the law prescribed the place of imprisonment,
the court is without jurisdiction to direct imprisonment elsewhere. Frankey v. Patten, 75 Utah 231,
84 Pac. 318, and cases cited therein. * * *
"Weber County and Ogden City maintain jointly a building, two floors of which are devoted to
a jail. The City Jail is on the eleventh floor, the
County Jail on the twelfth floor, and many of the
facilities employed in the care and detention of the
prisoners are common to both jails. This proceeding is avowedly for the purpose of securing from
the court an announcement of the respective duties
and obligations of the city and county in this socalled 'joint' jail and to secure a definition of the
rights and powers of the officers in charge thereof.
This court can pass only on questions presented to
it involving controversies. The validity of the sentence pronounced is here involved and nothing else
* * * (Folck) is entitled to be discharged from
serving a sentence which is herein declared void,
but as he plead guilty to the charge and it is only
the sentence and not the iudgment of conviction
which is void, it follows that the lower court has
iurisdiction to impose a proper sentence." ( Emphasis added.)
Of further interest is an annotation to the celebrated
Utah case of Lee Lim v. Davis, 75 Utah 245, 284 Pac. 323
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(1929), found in 76 A. L. R. at page 510, wherein the text
states:
"It is generally held that where the law prescribes a place of imprisonment, the court cannot
direct a different place, and if it does so, the sentence is void and the prisoner is entitled to a discharge, at least from that particular sentence. Accordingly, in the following cases the prisoner was
given either an absolute discharge or was discharged from the particular sentence and remanded
for a new sentence."
Numerous cases are then cited, among them the case
of Frankey V. Patten, referred to above. In summary, it
is the position of the State that the whole question in this
case is whether or not the original sentence was void. It
is respondent's position that this point has been well settled in the State of Utah and in the overwhelming major·
ity of other states, and in the federal courts, that it is. It
follows from this hmypothesis that the subsequent proceeding whereby the prisoner's petition for a writ of habeas
corpus was denied, and wherein his sentence was corrected,
was absolutely appropriate ·and consistent with law. The
State does not see how any other conclusion can be drawn
in the light of the authorities extant in the State of Utah
and elsewhere.
Respectfully submitted,
A. PRATT KESLER,
Attorney General,
STEPHEN L. JOHNSTON,
Assistant Attorney General,
Attorneys for Respondent.
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